Ted Forrest’s Amazing Analysis

This hand took place at the Bellagio poker room, in Las Vegas, in a mixed game-half $1,000-$2,000 seven card stud Eight or Better (S 8B), half $1,000-per-point Chinese Poker.  Ming Ly.Mitch, Chau Giang, and I had been playing four-handed for the better part of two days.

            The Stud Eight or Better has a $200 ante, with the high low poker card forced to open for $300.  The third-street raise completed the bet to $1,000, with the betting being set at $1,000 and $2,000 after that.  Ming brought it in low with the 8c ($300), and #hau then raised the bet to $1,000, showing the Ah card games.  I called with the 10c in the door and the 10s and 7s in the hole.  Mitch folded the Kd, and Ming called the $700 more.  On fourth street, Chau showed Ah-7h and bet out.  Now showing 10c and 9s, I called.  Ming called behind me with 8c and 6h limit stud.

            At this point, I felt that #hau’s most likely hand was four to a seven low.  I was less sure about Ming’s hand, but he probably had a pair and three babies (three low cards eight or below ) or four card games to an eight-low draw.  On fifth street, Chau caught the 7c, which gave him open sevens (Ah-7h-7c), which he bet.  I caught the 8h, and Ming caught a king.  my board showed 10-9-8 rainbow (no suits), and I raised the bet to $4,000 with tens and an open-ended straight draw. Ming folded his hand (which I liked ), and #hau called the raise.

            At this point, I was almost certain that #hau’s hand was a pair of sevens and four to a seven low.  I was also confident that he did not have a four flush, because he surely would have reraised me with that hand.  On sixth street, Chau caught the Jc while I caught a useless king (I was wishing we would have exchanged our sixth-street cards).  #hau checked and called my bet.

            When I did not improve my hand on sixth street and opted to bet anyway, I already knew what I would do on the river.  If #hau were to check to me, I would bet if I made a straight or three tens, even if I ended up with only a pair of tens.  I would check two pair, because I thought that he would not call with a lower two pair, and I would call only if #hau beat my hand. 

If he were to bet on the end, then I  would raise with two pair, because even though #hau would have most likely checked and called with a hand that beat tens up, there would be a reasonable chance that if he had chosen to fold this type of a hand often enough to justify the risk of the raise.  In other words, by raising on the end with two pair of tens up, I might force #hau to fold a better hand like aces up.  (Remember that a raise risks only one bet rather than two bets, because I must call his bet anyway, since he may be betting a low coty award).

            #hau looked at his last card, studied, and then bet.  He had made either a low hand or some type of high hand that beat tens up-he would not bet two small pair in this spot.  Well, according to my earlier thinking in the hand, I could just raise him dark, but I didn’t want to risk getting a reflex call from aces up or trip sevens.

            I am relatively sure that he was drawing dead to beat three tens or a straight, so I would have raised for value with these hands.  If he had reraised me, I would really have been shocked later were he to show me a high hand.  So if I did get reraised I would have an easy call-even with only two tens.  I looked at my last card, which was the useless 3h.  useless to me, but at least it made a heart flush even less likely for #hau

            In for a penny, in for a proud.  I went ahead and raised.  Then #hau stood up out of  his chair and looked at my board.  I noticed  he had a sick look on his face.  #hau started analyzing the play of the hand out loud.  We were all tired, and he was taking a long time making his decision.  At this point, I know that he had made some type of a high hand, and I was thinking that the worst his hand could be was jacks up.

            I felt OK for about poker the first 20 seconds of #hau’s pondering, but then I started thinking about the fact that there was about $25,000 out there and I had two tens-my hand couldn’t possibly be good.  #hau had jacks up, or even three sevens, and it was only $2,000 for him to look me up.  I was really hoping he had the jacks up.  Even though all three holdings were essentially the same against my hand, it just seemed like it was psychologically easier to lay down jacks up than to lay down the other two hands.

            I could feel #hau replaying the hand and counting the pot and realizing that the pot was laying him over 12-to-1 odds on a $2,000 call.  I didn’t know that I would have called myself in this spot, since the odds could well be more than 12 to 1 that I had a pat hand in this situation.  #hau had been thinking for probably only about 50 seconds, although to me it seemed more like 3 minutes.  I was really starting to sweat it when Ming inadvertently came to my rescue by suggesting to Mitch that we change the game to just Chinese Poker player and would likely have welcomed the change.

            What a wonderful opportunity for me to appear unconcerned with my hand and the $25,000 sitting in the middle of the table.  I began arguing that we had been playing both games all day and all night, and that we were not going to change now.  I am considered something of a sucker at Chinese Poker, and it may well be true, so it was very natural for me to insist that we not change the game.  I think my concern and my attention toward not changing the gaming news to Chinese Poker was enough to convince #hau that I had to have him beat and, much to my relief, his cards sailed into the muck high limit action 1980.

            Let’s dissect this hand a bit.  I think my third-street call with a pair of tens was somewhat bad, considering that #hau Giang raised with an ace, although the suited seven with the tens helped a bit.  #hau would generally raise with all but his worst hands in this spot, but my hand was still oftentimes in bad shape.  I would have hated it if Mitch had called with his king behind me, and I would have looked to end the hand without immediate improvement.  On third street, I made what was likely a bad call.  You see, Chau had picked up his cards in a comfortable, relaxed fashion.  This suggested to me that he had a legitimate hand that he was comfortable with, such as three babies.  I think that if he had aces or a pocket pair, Chau would have been more guarded about his hand.

            Generally, it is a mistake to lock yourself into putting your opponent on one type of hand and then marrying yourself to that read.  But in this case, I liked it that I did that.  I was as sure as I could be that #hau had three babies.

            On fourth street, Chau’s bet, my call with tens and a three to a straight flush, and Ming’s call with 8-6 showing were all natural.  #hau’s bet on fifth street, showing Ah-7h-7c, is natural.  I like my raise with tens and an open-ended straight draw, which included the 7s.  I probably had the best high hand, plus a draw to a big hand.  Getting rid of Ming (with the raise), if he had three to a low and a pair, made it more likely for me to scoop the pot. And there was also some chance that I could cause a bad low draw to fold, which would be very profitable for my hand.

            On sixth street, I had an important decision.  I was not a big favorite over sevens and a low draw that also contained an ace and a jack.  There was also some chance that I was beaten already-although I felt confident that the tens were good.  It would be reasonable to check on sixth street, but I believe that after raising on fifth street, it was better to bet.  By betting, you are very likely to eliminate the possibility of a call from two small pair on the end bad beat.

            In my opinion, my raise on the river was a good decision.  The pot was laying me more than 11-to-1 odds ($22,800 to $2,000) on my raise.  (Remember, I would have to call anyway, because #hau might have been betting a low, and a raise would risk only one bet, not two, if my analysis of the hand was correct and #hau couldn’t make a reraising high hand).  It was probably about even money that the raise-bluff would work.  But even if I was wrong, it couldn’t have been more than 3-to-1 or 4-to-1 odds against its working, and I was getting a much bigger price than that.

            I need to credit Ming with an inadvertent assist on the bluff for suggesting that we change the game.  Often, if your opponent is engaged in conversation and he is speaking naturally, one can assume that he is unlikely to be bluffing.  Ming gave me the opportunity to send out a false tell to #hau, which #hau found to be believable.

Phil two cents: This hand illustrates the amount of reading, thinking, logic, gamesmanship, and bluffing that occur in poker on a hand-by-hand basis.  Ted gives us a rare glimpse into the high-stakes poker world that runs 24/7 in Las Vegas.